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Abstract When I’m hungry, I try to seek some food, namely an object that is 
edible and that can feed me and preferably it has to be tasty. It seems a very easy task 
to find it for there is an alleged natural boundary between what counts as food and 
what does not. I can naturally pinpoint that boundary. Nevertheless, at a closer 
inspection, such boundary turns out to be suspicious: a roasted human being is both 
edible and nutritious, and someone may even find it tasty, and yet it can be hardly 
considered as food. Likewise, a rotten food item is neither edible, nor nutritious and 
however it can be sometimes considered as food, such as marcescent cheese. Our 
aim in this paper is to nail down the different conceptions which regulate our 
conception of what is a food and then come up with a proper definition. We set forth 
four different stances: a biological one, i.e., food is what holds certain natural 
properties, an individual one, i.e., food is what can be eaten by at least one person, an 
authority one, i.e., food is what is considered so by an authority, and a social one. 
i.e., food is what is institutionally recognized as food.  
Keywords: Metaphysics of Ordinary Objects, Semantics of Culinary 
Terms, Hunger, Food Ontology, Nature/Culture Divide.  
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0. Introduction: When is it food? 
  
Our concern in this paper is to provide an answer to a very basic and 
fundamental question, call it the Food Question. This is the question When is it food? 
raised in reference to some concoctions of (edible) stuff.  Ideally this question has an 
answer that spell out what are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions in order 
for an item to be food. Coming at it from another angle, in this paper we shall argue 
that the predicate ‘To Be a Food’ can be defined in a spectrum of positions, which 
we divide into four main classes.  
When is it food? is more momentous than it might seem. It is worth 
answering for four reasons. First, the metaphysical fascinating nature of food is not 
yet discovered and hence it can be better appreciated once some accounts of its 
nature are nailed down. As many food scholars, such as Pollan (2006: 15-31) and 
Belasco (2008: 15-34), claim the nature of food is more ambiguous than ever for 
western people are not aware of what food production and food chains amount to. 
Moreover, food can cast a new light over the debate about ordinary objects and 
social ontology and the nature/culture divide. Second, food is a central topic of many 
contemporary debates regarding malnourishment, eating disorders, fair trades. A 
good metaphysical characterization of food can improve the discussions shedding a 
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light on the very nature of food. Third, as Pollan (2006: 1) points out such question is 
far from being trivial in our age of «confusion and anxiety» about food for always 
newer dietary guidelines are built and proposed us by many different sources. Those 
dietary guidelines proponents want to impose us the right way of eating, e.g., 
governs often support the healthier diets (Barnhill, King, Kass, Faden: 
2014).  Fourth, it is disputed whether some items that we shall usually find at our 
table really count as food: does GMO count as food?, beef?, processed items?, raw 
items?, wild animals?, domesticated animals? The problem is then not just whether it 
is ethically admissible to eat such items but whether they are food. If we assume that 
an item counts as food if and only if (iff, thereafter) it lacks self-consciences then 
cows can be considered so but even human infants. If instead the criterium is fixed in 
pain experience, then cows should not be considered food but comatose people do. 
According to some religious dietary guidelines, pork and seafood do not count as 
food as well as according to some alternative diets OGM are not food for it is food 
only what is natural.  
Thus, When is it food? turns out to be deeply entrenched with the far more 
popular questions such as What is it right to eat? or  When is it right to eat that? 
Indeed, one cannot rest assured to have provided a clear answer to what is it right, in 
any of it possible understandings  (medical, ethical, political, aesthetical …), unless 
one knows how to fix the identity of what she is talking about.  
In the paper we distinguish four different positions regarding the Food 
Question.  
(1) A physical view on food according to which what is food is fixed by some 
natural intrinsic properties of the food items.  
(2) An individual view of food that holds that in order to be food an item had 
to be eaten by at least one human being.  
(3) An authority view of food that claim that what is food is established by an 
authority.  
(4) A social view of food that maintains that food is a socially constructed 
category. 
  
In the rest of the paper we outline these four main views showing both pros 
and cons for each. We do so by spelling out sets of internally consistent conditions 
that have to be also consistent with human life and human preferences.  As it turns 
out, each position must spell out the basic rules for belonging to the category of food. 
This category may be either semantical or ontological. In the first case the conditions 
should be interpreted as the application conditions of the predicate “To be a food.” In 
the second case the conditions should be taken as the basic rules for being a part of 
the ontological category of food.  We outrun this dilemma and do not take a stance 
on the metaphysical weight of those conditions.     
  
1. The Physical View of Food.   
  
According to the US Department of Health & Human Services, an item in 
order to be food has to hold a minimal nutritional value, namely it has to contain the 
following eight nutrients: protein, vitamin A, vitamin C, niacin, riboflavin, thiamine, 
calcium, and iron. The FAO, in explaining what is food security, stresses that a food 
item has to bear sufficient energy and nutrient intake.  
Both organizations hold that food items are physical entities that bear 
biological components that our body converts into energy and employs in order to 
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repair and improve itself. A food item can do those great things since it holds the 
appropriate biological properties that make it suitable to be eaten and to turn it into 
energy. That is, ‘To Be Food’ is coextensive with ‘Being Edible’ under a particular 
interpretation of edibility in which it means both to be not harmful and to be 
beneficial. Since even some kinds of drugs have the same very general properties, 
edibility should be in turn implemented by nutritionality. That is, a food item has to 
contain several nutrients useful for sustaining and developing human life.  
The physical answer to the Food question has thus the following form:  
  
x is a food item iff it both edible and nutritious.   
  
The answer posits two elements then and a relation between them. It will be 
worthwhile spelling out the physical view as a three-place relation: some (typically 
material) entity, some diner, and a natural relation between the two - call it edibility 
relation. The relation may be intransitive (if something F is food for a diner D1, and 
D1 is food for another diner D2, then F need not be food for D2. E.g. some wood is 
food for some worm and that worm is food for some human, but the wood is inedible 
for the human.) The edibility relation may also be reflexive, for there are 
documented cases of autophagia. Finally, the relation may be both symmetric (e.g. 
human beings can eat some worms, and vice versa), and asymmetric (e.g. human 
beings can eat some apples, but not vice versa).  
This view has the merit of being clear and to highlight that food is worth for 
remaining alive and developing human beings’ life. It states an objective standard 
particularly important for feeding developing countries, too often starved.  
However, such physical conception of food seems to be too poor: edibility 
and to be nutritious are not enough for considering an item as food (Borghini, Piras, 
Serini forthcoming). Indeed, such features should be related to a diner: what is edible 
for someone, say milk, is not edible for a lactose intolerant person. What is nutritious 
for a sedentary person is not such for a sports person, as Pogge (2016) points out. 
Therefore, the edibility relation is not a universal standard but at most an individual 
one.  
There is another aspect of what food is which is worth considering: how to be 
feed is a capacity that has to be learnt and then developed (Korthals 2017; Thompson 
2015: 22; Adams 2010: 47-63): how to distinguish healthy items from poisonous 
ones, how to get food, e.g., by haunting, how to prepare an item in order to turn it 
into food, e.g., by cooking or by removing harmful substances, how to make a 
distinction between tasty and disgusting foods (Pollan 2006; Pollan 2013). More in 
general, there is a social element that makes an item food. Indeed different human 
communities eat different items and sometimes there is not a universal agreement on 
what counts as food, e.g., Kosher cuisine that bans pork from the dietary guidelines 
of Jews, the western disgust for insects, and so on. Hence, the two alleged features of 
food do not naturally belong to certain items but often they are either obtained by 
some sort of human process, e.g., by cooking, or singled out of reality through a 
social recognition, e.g., by religious norms that baptize an item as food.  
The physical view of food thus has to face three problems: (i) the alleged 
features of food do not ensure that an item is or is not a food; (ii) the two features 
cannot exist alone without being related with a diner; (iii) there is an implicit 
individual or social element in each food choice that the physical view does not take 
into account.  
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2. The Individualistic View of Food.   
Even if we all human beings belong to the same species, each of us bears 
his/her own preference and eating habits. Furthermore, sometimes it seems that what 
is food for a specific human being is not so for another one, e.g., people who eat 
stones or objects made of iron. More often, personal tastes and habits underlie the 
concept of food that each of us personally employ for picking food items out of the 
world. Not only what is a good food for me can be bad for you, but what is a food for 
me can turn out to be inedible for you. Due to the social life such food habits often 
overlap each other but it seems that just as often they are disjointed.  
According to this account, food is most plausibly generated 
individualistically: something turns into a food if and only if it is edible for at least 
one individual. Under this view, some class of entities C turns into a food even when 
only one item in that class is eaten only once by only one person (i.e., even when it 
has not and will never be considered as food elsewhere). For instance, a human being 
can turn a species of reptiles into food simply by eating one of them, despite of such 
reptiles never having been regarded as food by anyone else.  
The individual answer to the Food question has thus the following form:  
  
x is a food item iff it is eaten by at least one diner.   
 
Actually, this thesis has at least three interpretations, since it can be spelled 
out in terms of lesser or greater radicality. The individualistic generation of food may 
be instituted by means of an individual act, an individual preferences or an individual 
physiology.  
The first interpretation posits that an object is a food iff it is eaten at least 
once by one person but that does not prevent that other persons may eat it and even 
find it tasty. In this case, the fact that an item is a food is occasionally discovered by 
a person but this discovery can open up the edible path for other people. For 
instance, there must have been a person who first discovered that apples are edible. 
He discovered that fact through an act and then apples become a part of human 
diets.  
The second interpretation claims that something is a food iff it is tasty for at 
least one person. In this case what counts is the individual preference over the mere 
edibility. It claims that food in order to be so has to be appreciated by at least an 
individual. This interpretation clearly narrower and privatize the domain of food, 
since each person is hereby authorized to settle her/his own conception of food 
which collapse on her/his own standard of taste. Hence, each person can keep the 
preferred foods in and keep the hated foods out of the universal domain of food since 
each one set up her/his own criterium.  
The third interpretation relies on the individual physical possibility to eat 
certain items. It does not rest on individual preference but instead on individual 
genetic features, e.g., celiac people should not include among food items the ones 
that contain gluten as well as lactose intolerant can rule milk and dairy products out 
of the domain of food.  
Every interpretation of the individual view brings with it some cons. The first 
interpretation can account for the discovery of new foods, that is not based on 
scientific investigation insofar as what counts as food is what is eaten at least once. 
To put in a slogan: What count as food for a person is what she actually eat. The 
second interpretation can cash out the idea that each person has different tastes and 
what is food depends what pleases the senses. For everyone has, more or less, 
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different senses (Cosmeyer 1999: 87-89) it can be claimed tath, as it has been once 
said, «people live in different taste worlds» (Spence 2017 :73). That is, what counts 
as food for a person is what she would like to eat. The third interpretation assigns to 
each person her own food domain on the basis of her physiology. What counts as 
food for a person is what she can actually eat.  
Generally speaking, each interpretation set forth a framework in which just 
the individual experience of each human being provide the right definition of food 
corroborating a private view on food. It entails that this view is very inclusive and 
respectful of each possible food domain.  
However, this view has many qualities as fault. Three serious objections may 
be raised against this view, one for each specific interpretation. Moreover, one 
further objection is raised against the general approach.  
All the three criticisms are properly against the privatization of food domain, 
by acts, preferences, physiology. Just like Wittgenstein argued against the possibility 
of a private language, it is contentious that a private food could exist. First, the 
possibility of performing certain acts rather than others is due to the common 
membership to human species. Indeed, certain items turn into food by means of 
physical acts only because our body can perform those acts, e.g., grasp an apple from 
a tree is possible for we have opposable thun and the right height. That is, physical 
properties that  we share with the most human beings. Furthermore, we can do such 
acts for we have learnt some basic rules about food, e.g., consistency and texture 
matter since we cannot bite too hard item and we learnt that ever since we were 
young. Finally, our metabolism is both shared by all human beings and more 
specifically by the ones with whom we usually share meals (Stinson 1992). Second, 
tastes are both genetically and socially constructed, e.g. Højlund 2015. The very fact 
that we share most of our gastric physiology with other human beings, more 
specifically with the members of our own culture, goes toward the conclusion that 
the food domain is constructed by more than one human beings for her taste is 
constructed by a collective actions, both physical and social. Third, the diseases or 
idiosyncrasies are usually shared by  groups, diachronically and synchronically. Even 
if it were not the case, what a person with a specific disease can eat is picked by 
experts out of the food domain they are aware and therefore the food domain of that 
person is not at any rate yielded by an individual choice.  
The last criticism concerns all the three interpretations just under a certain 
light, namely when the individual claim that only what she eats is food whereas 
every other item which is eaten by anyone else is not. It is a clear form of hasty 
generalization. Such inference has as a premise “only what is food for me is food” 
and as conclusion “what is food for you, but not for me, is not food at all”. As we 
have seen in each of the three interpretations such a privatization is impossible due to 
our common belonging to the human species and to a specific culture.  
Eventually, the individual view only seems to capture the difference in eating 
while it rather fails to do it.  
 
3. The Authority View of Food. 
 When one has to decide what and how to eat perhaps she does so in 
according to a norm that states what counts as food and what does not. Jews know 
that pork is not food due to the norms written in the Shulchan Arukh, an European 
child knows that a locust is not a food due to her parents prescriptions, a person with 
high cholesterol knows that candies are not food due to her doctor’s indications, most 
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of the world’s people know that other human beings are not food both for national 
and international legislation, and ethical rules.  
Those norms have been stated by someone who exerts a power on everyone 
else for she/he has the authority of doing so. At least three authorities can be put 
forward: (i) religious authority; (ii) governmental authority; (iii) scientific authority. 
Each of them exerts the authority for different reasons and with different aims: 
religious authority is supposed to speak on behalf of god or gods and its aim is to 
make people’s life just and godly; governmental authority emanates from different 
sources and it depends on the institutional system itself. Its aim is to align people’s 
life with more general national goals, e.g., generalized health, saving, sustainability, 
and so on. Finally, scientific authority derives its power to science itself which is 
supposed to take reality at the face value. Its aim is to improve people's well being by 
means of scientific inquiries.  
The Authority answer to the Food Question has thus the following form:  
 
x is a food iff it obeys the norms stated by the right authority.  
 
Although the authority answer seems trivial for the left hand of the 
biconditional is not properly defined by the right one, it is not so. The right-side 
depends on the specific authority which has to fill the blank.  
Hence, once we choose the right source of authority, we can be sure that the 
items it  baptizes as ‘foods’ are really foods, for it has the right to establish what it 
is.  
Unfortunately, each of the aforementioned forms of authority fall short to 
define food once and for all.  
 The religious authority suffers from two main criticisms: there are too many 
gods (for a nice survey on religions and dietary guidelines, see Corrie 2012); and 
there can be a division between worshippers and lays. The first criticism relies on a 
sort of relativism, according to which since there are many religious authorities each 
of which claims different prescriptions about food we cannot endorse one or another 
just because we chose it for reasons tied to our background (Comstock 2012). Even 
if we are willing to claim that our faith is the right one we should concede that we 
cannot impose it to other people, and here arose the second criticism: we don’t have 
the right to say what is food to other people.  
The governmental authority is free of those criticism since it is supposed to 
be endorsed by all the people who live under it. Nevertheless,  at least two objections 
to that can be raised: first, not all the people under a government support it and 
furthermore the government could lack the right legitimacy to impose on its citizens 
what is food. It is possible that different cultures coexist under one and the same 
government, e.g., USA is a multinational state. In this case: which culture should the 
government endorse for defining what is food? It is also possible that an alleged 
homogeneous culture is rather stratified in classes or interest groups each of which 
with its own view on food, e.g., Ankeny 2016. Furthermore, is it contended that 
governs can dictate what is or what has to be food. The more frequent reprimand 
against this power is the so-called “paternalism argument”  according to which 
governs do not have the power to impose their own vision to their citizens.  
Eventually, there is the scientific authority that can claim what is food on the 
light of science which can highlight the very nature of food on the basis of the 
physical properties of the relevant items themselves. Its alleged plausibility is 
reinforced by its aim: a scientific view shall promote health and well-being. 
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Nevertheless, even the scientific authority is undermined by two arguments: first, 
this view collapses on the physical view since it relies on the material features of 
food that are not enough, as we already stressed. Second, even the aim however 
noble and virtuous relies on a social function assignment that is observe-relative. 
Indeed, as Searle (2007: 8)  puts it, «if we thought that life and survival were 
worthless, that the only thing that really mattered was death and extinction, then 
hearts would be disfunctional, and cancer would have a useful function: it would 
hasten extinction». The same can be said for food: only if we assume that health and 
well-being are valuable items science with its aim can underlie our concept of food.  
 
4. The Social View of Food.  
  
The last view that can be held is that foods are social items. According to the 
social view of food, food is generated by a collective agency (e.g. a mutual 
understanding of certain linguistic and behavioural norms). The specific social 
conception we would uphold is tied to the social ontology we buy into.  
Accordingly, an item turns into food by means of a human intentional act that 
may be either physical, e.g., foraging, cultivation, or mental, e.g., labelling, naming, 
and that should rely on a wide and shared intentionality. The social view also entails 
that there are no foods in nature (Montanari 2006) but at most there are items that 
can dispositionally be food with proviso that they have to be recognized as such by a 
social group.  
We need not delve into unnecessary details here, but we may devise at least 
three ways of understanding such a recognition. The recognition may be a sort of 
(unspoken or spoken) social convention, as e.g. in the case of gender; or it may be 
the resultant of an institutional activity (as, e.g. in the case of marriage) sanctioning 
the application of the predicate; or it is a «non cooperative equilibria of strategic 
games»  (Guala and Hindrinks 2015: 178). Anyway the social answer to the Food 
question takes the following form:  
 
x is a food just in case it is socially recognized as such.  
 
That is, ‘To Be a Food’ applies to an entity just in case there is a right sort of 
recognition on the part of some agents within a society. Food is then a cultural item, 
that varies from society to society each of which posits its own food ontology, 
although they can overlap. As a cultural item it might lead us to figure out food as: 
(i) a language (Marrone 2016); (ii) a representation (Adams 2018); (iii) an identity 
marker (Fischler 1988); (iv) an artwork (Telfer 1996); (v) a political tool 
(Mendelson-Forman and Chapple-Sokol 2014).  
This view clarifies why different culture recognize different items as food and 
why enogastronomic traditions are so different. Furthermore, it can sheds a light on 
the import of food for individual and collective identities.  
Although the social or institutional aspects of food are most often 
underscored, it is controversial whether all foods are social or institutional. That is, it 
is controversial whether the social view can provide a sufficient condition for an item 
being’s food. For instance, the case of babies in the womb; allegedly they receive 
foods, but the social or institutional natures of such foods may remain questionable, 
at least from the perspectives of the babies. As well as it is controversial whether a 
patient feed through a drip has a social relation with this food. Both cases rest on the 
assumption that both the feeder and the feeded should recognize an item as food by 
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means of a social act. In the former case it can be claimed that not even the feeder 
has to socially recognize food. While in the latter case, the fact that the feeder 
recognize drip as food by a social act casts doubts.  
On the other hand, one may hold that all foods under the social conception 
are also foods under the physical conception and hence the social view cannot even 
be a necessary condition. That is, an item in order to be food has to be physically so 
and it underlies the social recognition. Yet, this may be the case, only if we deny that 
social or institutional norms can regard some inedible items as foods. This 
assumption is called into question also by items that does not bear a nutritional 
import, ranging from items we eat that have mostly a symbolic function (e.g. a host 
during mess) to items we consume for pure pleasure (e.g. chewing gums) or items we 
must consume because of their medical properties (e.g. vitamins in pills).   
 
Conclusion.  
 
 The main aim of our paper was to survey four views about the nature of 
food: as a physical item, as an item generated individualistically, as given by the 
authority, as a social object. We went through them highlighting the main pros and 
cons of each view. Nevertheless, we did not explicitly buy into any of them and we 
rather interrelated them showing how they can be contrasted against each other. 
Nevertheless, we have assumed a substantive thesis across the paper, namely the 
right way of eating essentially depends on what is our preliminary conception of 
food.  
The paper would like to be a reference tool for those who study food from 
both an ethical, political, and a more theoretical point of view. It can be usefully 
employed for better addressing debates over sustainability, food identity, food 
sovereignty, and food security and hopefully to open a new path of inquiry.  
 
References  
Adams, C.J. (1990), The Sexual Politics of Meat. A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical 
Theory of Meat, Continuum, New York-London, 2010.  
Adams, M. (2018), «The Aesthetic Value of Local Food», The Monist, 101, pp. 324-
339.  
Ankeney, R. A. (2016), «Inviting Everyone to the Table: Strategies for More 
Effective and Legitimate Food Policy via Deliberative Approaches»,  Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 47, n. 1, pp. 10-24.  
Barnhill, A., King, K.F., Kass, N., Faden, R. (2014), «The Value of Unhealthy 
Eating and the Ethics of Healthy Eating Policy», Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Vol. 
24, n. 3, pp. 187-217.  
Belasco, W. (2008), Food. The Key Concepts, Berg, Oxford.  
Borghini, A., Piras, N., Serini, B. (forthcoming), «Ontological Framework for Food 
Utopias», Rivista di Estetica.  
Comstock, G. (2012), «Ethics and Genetically Modified Food», In Kaplan D.M. 
(Ed.), The Philosophy of Food, University of California Press, Berkeley.  
RIFL (anno) numero: pagina-pagina (Garamond, 10) 
DOI: numero  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
9  
Corrie, E.N. (2012), «Food and Religion», In Pilcher, J.M. (Ed.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Food History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 410-428.  
Cosmeyer, K. (1999), Making Sense of Taste. Food and Philosophy, Cornell 
University Press, Itaha and London.  
Fischler, C. (1988), «Food, Self, and Identity», Social Science Information, 27, pp. 
275-293.  
Højlund, S. (2015), «Taste as a Social Sense: Rethinking Taste as a Social Activity», 
Flavour, Vol. 4, n. 6.  
Korthals, M. (2017), «Ethics of Dietary Guidelines: Nutrients, Processes and 
Meals», Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 30, N. 3, pp. 413-421.  
Mendelson-Forman, J, Chapple-Sokol, S., (2014) «Conflict Cuisine: Teaching War 
through Washington’s Ethnic Restaurant Scene», Public Diplomacy Magazine, Vol. 11, pp. 
21-26. 
Marrone, G. (2016), Semiotica del gusto. Linguaggi della cucina, del cibo della 
tavola, Mimesis, Milano-Udine.  
Montanari, M. (2006), Food Is Culture, Columbia University Press, New York.  
Pogge, T. (2016), «The Hunger Games», Food Ethics, Vol. 1, n. 1, pp. 9-27.  
Pollan, M. (2006), The Omnivore's Dilemma. A Natural History of Four Meals, 
Penguin, New York.  
Pollan, M. (2013), Cooked: A Natural History of Transformation, Penguin, New 
York.  
Rivera, D.,  Obón, C.,  Heinrich, M., Inocencio, C., Verde, A., Fajardo, J., «Gathered 
Mediterranean Food Plants – Ethnobotanical Investigations and Historical Development», In 
Heinrich, M., Müller, W.E., Galli, C. (eds), Local Mediterranean Food Plants and 
Nutraceuticals, Karger, Basel. 
Searle, J. (2007), Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society, In Margolis, E., 
Laurence, S. (Eds.), Creations of the Mind. Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 3-18.  
Spence, C. (2017), Gastrophysics. The New Science of Eating, Penguin, New York.  
Stinson, S. (1992), «Nutritional Adaptation», Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 
21, pp. 143-170.  
Telfer, E. (1996), Food for Thought. Philosophy and Food, Routledge, New York 
and London.  
Thompson, P.B. (2015), From Field to Fork. Food Ethics for Everyone, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.  
 
